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this system. The costs, which come in terms of limited influence over worker 
rights and work conditions,  are very difficult to quantify. 
A final point  worth  stressing is that’tradeoffs between real  incomes and 
competitiveness  are  only  avoided  once  the  investment-productivity  gain 
cycle gets going. Korea cut real wages to give an initial boost and to get the 
“engine”  moving  both  in  the  early  1960s  and  during  adjustments  in 
1980-81. 
11  Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
In this chapter we assess the role of fiscal and monetary policy in Korea’s 
experience with external debt. One important issue is the financing of fiscal 
deficits.  Did the government borrow heavily from abroad or rapidly expand 
the domestic money  supply in order to finance large budget deficits? Both 
factors figured prominently  in the experience of many Latin American debtor 
countries, however, both turn out to play much smaller parts for Korea. Still 
they  are  of  interest  precisely  because  they  highlight  some  of  the  aspects 
which  distinguish  Korea’s  debt  history  from  the  history  of  many  other 
countries which have had less successful recoveries. 
A second issue is the role of fiscal and monetary  policies in achieving the 
phenomenal  growth  rates  which  have  enabled  Korea  to service  very  large 
external debts.  To  summarize  our conclusions  at the outset, we  argue that 
fiscal policies have been  used countercyclically,  but that they  were not  the 
predominant explanation for rapid growth. Monetary policies,  on the other 
hand,  have played  a  central role, although  not  through  excessive  inflation 
finance because the  allocation of  domestic credit has been a centerpiece  in 
the  government’s  industrial  policies  which  have  successfully  targeted 
high-growth export industries. 
11.1  Brief History 
An  overview of  the  development  of  Korea’s  financial  and  fiscal  sectors 
provides a useful base for examining the current systems.’ The key issues of 
the  linkages  between  government  finances,  monetary  policy,  and  external 
borrowing  are not new,  but emerged  at the outset as Korea recovered  first 
from World War I1 and then from the Korean War. 
The  developments  through  the  early  1970s  can  be  divided  into  three 
stages.  In  the  early  stage,  prior  to  1945,  Korea  enjoyed  a  very  highly 
developed financial system run by the Japanese to mobilize resources for the 
colonial expansion and later to help finance military spending.  The system 283  KoredChapter 11 
was modeled on Japan’s, with the very close relationship between business 
and  government  which  characterizes  their  approach  and  which  has  had 
significant influence on the current Korean system. In fact, statistics suggest 
that the fiscal and banking systems were more developed in  1940 than they 
were  in  1975. Government revenues were 21 percent of  GNP in  1940 as 
compared to  16 percent in  1975, while the ratios of  M2 to GNP were 44 
percent in  1940 and only 34 percent in  1975. 
The second stage, between the collapse of  the Japanese system in  1945 
and the beginnings of an independent Korean system in the mid-l960s,  was 
dominated by the role of foreign aid inflows and the interactions between the 
U.S.  and  Korean  governments.  The systems  stood  in  market  contrast to 
those  that  had  collapsed,  with  “no  money  and  capital  markets  in  the 
accepted sense of  the terms and no really adequate facilities for mobilizing 
such savings as are currently made and for channeling them into productive 
investments” (Mason et al. 1980, 301). Two critical problems were that the 
experienced  money  and  fiscal  managers  had  been  Japanese  and  that 
hyperinflation had removed confidence in the organized banking system. The 
gap was partially filled by expansion of  the unofficial money market. Unlike 
official institutions, the UMM  could operate using U.S.  dollars and  U.S. 
military payment certificates. Such curb markets have continued to play an 
important financial role in Korea. 
In this  second phase,  foreign aid flows and counterpart funds were the 
major sources of  funding for the government, giving rise to a seesaw for 
control between the Korean  and U.S. governments. On the one hand, the 
U.S. wanted a more western system with an independent central bank and a 
revised  tax  system  to  provide  resources  for  government  spending.  They 
wished  to  have  aid  flows  be  conditional  on  the  fulfillment  of  specified 
criteria-the  government deficit and the growth of bank credit. The Koreans, 
on  the  other  hand,  pushed  for  continued  aid,  allowing  the  government 
continued control over the allocation of credit to finance reconstruction, and 
maintaining close ties with the business sector. 
The decade from 1954 to 1964, which resembled a tug-of-war between the 
two  approaches,  can  be  divided  into  four  periods.  From  1954 to  1956 
increasing  government  expenditures  and  bank  loans  were  financed  by 
significant aid  inflows, while domestic (bank) savings declined relative to 
output. From 1957 to 1960 the situation was reversed, with aid, government 
spending,  bank  lending,  and  real  growth  all  falling,  and  government 
revenues and bank deposits both rising relative to GNP. The initial years of 
the Park regime,  1961-62,  were again expansionary, followed by  another 
U.S.-imposed contraction in  1964-65. 
The  1961-62  period  is  especially  interesting.  The  new  government 
instituted a number of financial reforms, all of  which significantly increased 
bank  credit.  It  reorganized agricultural financing  institutions,  created  the 
Small and  Medium Industry Bank,  and  authorized the KDB  to guarantee 
foreign  loans  and  to  borrow  abroad.  It  also  regained  ownership  of  the 284  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
commercial banks and brought the BOK under the control of the Ministry of 
Finance. In addition to the accelerated money growth (nearly 50 percent from 
June 196  1 to June 1962), a rise in government spending from 18 to 24 percent 
of  GNP pushed  the  budget  deficit  from  2  to 4  percent.  An  unfortunate 
consequence  of  the expansion was  a revival  of  inflation.  In  response,  the 
government attempted a currency reform in June 1962. A new currency was 
issued with limited conversion. However, the resulting lack of funds crippled 
all  business  activity  so  severely  that  the  government  began  to  relax  the 
measures within  one week,  and within  five weeks  the measures  had  been 
totally eliminated. 
The ineffective reform was succeeded by a U.S.-Korean  stabilization plan 
which cut public expenditure from 24.1 percent in  1962 to  11.5 percent of 
GNP by  1964. M2 fell from nearly  15 percent of GNP in  1962 to barely 9 
percent in  1964, as lack of  confidence in  the official banking  system con- 
tributed to a new growth spurt in the unofficial money market. 
By  1965 Korea had entered a third stage of financial/fiscal development in 
which  external  governments  played  a  diminishing  role  in  the  decision 
making.  The  Park  administration  had  formed  a  system with  the  financial 
sector  firmly  controlled  by  the  government  and  with  the  government, 
through  the  allocation  of  (domestic  and  foreign)  credit,  firmly  linked  to 
business decision making. 
The major remaining issue was how to replace the declining aid inflows, 
and the government turned  to the problem of  mobilizing  domestic savings 
and nonaid external funds to finance government spending and investment. 
The system of  foreign loan guarantees, combined with special incentives to 
exporters, had already begun to generate foreign (nonaid) inflows. The 1965 
financial  reform,  which  raised  interest  rates  on  bank  deposits,  was 
undertaken  in  the hope of  stimulating private savings and channeling it to 
official  financial  institutions.  As  we  have  seen,  both  elements  proved 
extremely  successful. By the  beginning  of  the  1970s, private savings had 
risen from 6 to 7 percent to 18 percent of GNP and foreign debt had jumped 
from 7 percent to over 30 percent of GNP. 
The key pieces in the story continued to be investment, private savings, 
government  savings, and foreign  savings. Investment,  private  savings, and 
foreign  savings  have  been  discussed  in  previous  chapters.  Government 
savings (revenues and expenditures) and the role of fiscal policy in  Korean 
macroeconomic performance are discussed in section 1  1.2 of this chapter. In 
section 1 1.3 we examine the financial system and the allocation of credit. 
11.2  Fiscal Policy 
11.2.1  Structure 
Korea’s  public  sector  is  quite  complex.  It  is  composed  of  a  central 
government and five special public enterprise funds, which together make up 285  KoreafChapter 11 
the consolidated public sector, In addition, there are local governments and a 
number  of  nonfinancial  public  enterprises.  Because  of  data  delays  and 
revisions,  and  because  of  the  difficulties  of  adequately  accounting  for 
intergovernmental transfers, the consolidated public sector excludes the local 
governments. We  focus on the activities of  the consolidated public sector. 
The central government consists of  the general account, which  accounts 
for most  of  total  revenues and  approximately 80 percent of  expenditures, 
fifteen special accounts, and twenty-four special funds. The public enterprise 
funds include the Grain Management Fund, which purchases and sells grains 
and which became very important during the disastrous agricultural output 
during 1978-82.  Although their expenditures have been very large in some 
years,  these  funds  contribute  relatively  little  to  the  consolidated  budget 
because only the net surplus or deficit of  the public enterprise funds enters 
the accounts. 
Table 11.1 shows the revenues, expenditures, and budget deficits for the 
central government and the consolidated public sector. The top panel of the 
table gives the figures in billions of won, while the bottom panel takes ratios 
of  each variable to GNP.  The net  financial transactions column  gives  the 
deficit or surplus in  the public enterprise funds, which is included with the 
central government deficit in the consolidated budget deficit. The last four 
columns of the table give the sources of deficit financing. The domestic bank 
financing is taken  from the monetary,  and not  the fiscal,  accounts and  is 
identically equal to the change in banking sector credit to the government.’ 
1  1  .2.2  General Trends 
Figure 11.1 plots public sector revenues and expenditures relative to GNP 
from  1970 to  1985. It shows large swings in both series between  1970 and 
1975.  Since  then,  revenues  have  been  considerably  more  stable  than 
expenditures, rising gradually until 1981 and then tapering off slightly. Thus, 
recent changes in the budget were due primarily to changes in spending. As 
we shall see, there have also been significant changes in the composition of 
expenditures. 
There has also been considerable variance in the sources of finance for the 
public  sector deficit. The share financed by  domestic banks has tended to 
increase as  the  size of  the deficit  has  grown.  In  1972,  1975, and  1981, 
approximately 45 percent of a deficit which  was 4-5  percent of GNP was 
funded by  domestic credit.  Recoveries from each of  the three  debt crises 
have involved reductions in the total bank credit to the public sector. 
In the remainder of  this section, we look at spending and revenues more 
closely. In addition to table  11.1, the discussion refers to the fiscal statistics 
in the Data Appendix. These tables include a decomposition of  revenues by 
type,  and  functional  and  economic  decompositions  of  public  sector 
expenditure. 
For most of  the 1970-86  period, the stance of Korean fiscal policy seems 
closely  tied  to  the  performance  of  the  domestic  economy.  During  the Table 11.1  Consolidated Public Sector Budget 
Central Government  Net  Consolidated Public Sector  Domestic 
Financial  Net 
Year  Revenues  Expenditures  Deficit  Transactions  Revenues  Expenditures  Deficit  Financing  Bank  Nonbank  Foreign 
Panel A (in billions of  won) 
1970 
1971 
1972  -  - 
1973 
1974  1,038.70  1,203.00 
1975  1,653.60  1,765.30 
1976  2,326.60  2,518.90 
1977  2,958.40  3,274.40 
1978  4,107.70  4,408.00 
1979  5,445.40  5.990.00 
1980  6,833.20  7.682.00 
1981  8.604.80  10,189.00 
1982  9,983.20  11,639.20 
1983  11,537.50  12,200.10 
1984  12,603.30  13,444.60 
1985  13,638.30  14,653.90 
-  - 
-  - 
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459.50 Panel  B  (in percentage GNP) 
1970  - 
1971  - 
1972  ~ 
1973  - 
1974  13.84 
1975  16.38 
1976  16.76 
1977  16.33 
1978  16.96 
1979  17.43 
1980  18.63 
1981  19.07 
1982  19.68 
1983  19.56 
I984  18.98 
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107.69  107.69 
27.62  93.19 
32.00  25.97 
13.45  68.85 
39.38  26.25 
23.69  30.72 
54.51  56.62 
63.29  58.73 
30.38  58.33 
68.84  60.48 
41.72  27.07 
30.79  25.25 
50.86  30.41 
83.85  41.95 
70.84  33.54 
50.36  45.67 
Source:  EPB, Korean Economic Indicarors, and  MOF, Government Finance Statistics in  Korea. 
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Fig. 11.1  Public sector revenues and expenditures (% GNP) 
1970-72  economic  slowdown  following  a  period  of  high  growth  in 
1966-69,  revenues declined and  government  expenditures increased. The 
deficit was financed primarily from abroad during 1970-71,  but as aid flows 
declined, the financing shifted toward domestic sources. 
Expenditure was  sharply contracted in the  1973 economic boom.  At the 
same time, the government undertook a revision of the tax and tax collection 
systems.  However,  the  fiscal  deficit  reemerged  in  1974-75  during  the 
aftermath of the first oil shock, despite a rise in revenues. Expenditures were 
increased back up to 20 percent of output. The period of economic recovery 
from 1976 to 1979 included the stabilization of government expenditures and 
rising  revenues,  particularly  from  the  value-added  tax  (VAT)  and  from 
income taxes. There was some fiscal contraction during 1977 and  1979, as 
part  of  the  Comprehensive  Stabilization  Plan  (CSP)  and  because  of 
government  concern  over  rising  inflation. The  budget  deficit  fell  from  5 
percent of  GNP in  1975 to just  1 percent in  1979. 
The episode in  1979-83  is of  particular interest. Social unrest, the bad 
harvests, and  poor  economic performance  led  the government to  increase 
spending rapidly from  19 percent of  GNP in  1979 to 23 percent in  1981, 
pushing the deficit back to 5 percent of GNP. 
As shown in table  11.2, the rise coincided with a shift in the composition 
of  spending toward social  service^.^  Social services increased from 21.6 to 
29.3 percent  of  total  spending, with  an  almost comparable decline in  the 
share of  economic services. In  1980 the big increases came in  expenditure 
for housing. In  198  1 the additional expenditure was allocated to education, 
social  security,  and  welfare  (for  old  age  disabilities  and  government 
employees). Expenditure growth slowed in 1982 as the size and definition of 
the  public  sector was  red~ced.~  The removal of  some activities from the 289  KoredChapter  11 
Table 11.2  Composition of Expenditure 
Social Services 
Period  Defense  Economic Services  Total  Education Only 
1975-79  29.4  29.1  21.6  13.8 
1980-85  27.9  22.1  29.3  16.3 
public sector helps to explain the rapid drop in spending between  1981 and 
1983. This shift toward social services, including housing and education, has 
been maintained during  1983-86. 
One interesting point is that  expenditures as well  as revenues remained 
stable as a share of  output during  1983-86,  holding the deficit at just  1-2 
percent  of  GNP.  In  contrast to  previous episodes,  expenditures were  not 
increased (relative to output) as GNP growth slowed from 11 percent in 1983 
to 8.5 percent in 1984, and to just 5.4  percent in 1985. Instead, as discussed 
in  chapter  9,  the  government  reacted  to  the  slowdown  by  further 
depreciating the exchange rate in hopes of  stimulating the export sector. 
1  1.2.3  Fiscal Policy and the Business Cycle 
We  have seen that swings in public sector expenditures have brought about 
swings in the public deficit. Has the government actively used fiscal policies 
to influence economic activity? In  fact, there is considerable evidence that 
fiscal policy has been used  as a countercyclic policy tool,  at least through 
1983. 
There are a variety of difficulties in computing an appropriate fiscal policy 
indicator for use in assessing the effect on policy. One simple indicator is the 
relationship between government expenditures and economic growth. This is 
shown in figure 11.2 in which we plotted the real economic growth rate and 
expenditures as a share of GNP from 1970 to 1985. The figure shows a clear 
inverse relationship between the two series. 
Total expenditures are an  inadequate reflection of  fiscal policy  because 
they include automatic stabilizers, are sensitive to inflation rate and interest 
rate changes, and because they do not incorporate changes in tax policy. In a 
recent paper, Corbo and Nam (1976) have considered alternative measures of 
“fiscal impulse”  which adjust for some of  these  factor^.^  One measure is 
calculated using the IMF definition, which takes the difference between the 
actual budget deficit and a measure of  the  “cyclically  neutral”  deficit as a 
measure of  fiscal stimulus, as given in equation (1). 
B, is the actual budget surplus, Y, and Tare actual and potential income, and 
t  and  g  are the ratios of  revenue and expenditure to GNP in  a base  year 
(when actual and potential GNP were judged to be equal). The fiscal impulse 290  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
GNP GROWTH 
EXP('oGNP)  Expenditure -  GNP Growth ----  26  I  0.1563 
Fig. 11.2  Fiscal policy and economic growth 
measure, then, is FZ,,  the change in fiscal stimulus as a share of income (eq. 
2). 
(2)  FZ, =  A(FISt/Yt) 
Table  11.3 reproduced from the Corbo and Nam  paper,  shows the IMF 
fiscal measure together with real output growth, the actual budget deficit as a 
share of output each year, and the change from the previous year. Although 
the actual budget change and the IMF fiscal measure are nearly identical in 
some years (such as  1978 and  1982), it is clear from the table that cyclic 
factors  were  sometimes  quite  important.  For  example,  the  unadjusted 
measure overstates the expansionary stance of fiscal policy during 1971  -72 
and especially during 1980, when the adjusted indicator shows a contraction- 
ary fiscal policy instead of the strongly expansionary policy suggested by the 
unadjusted measure. 
Despite these differences,  the  adjusted fiscal  indicator retains  a  strong 
inverse relationship to economic growth over most of  the sample period.6 
The  only  exception  is  the  crisis  in  1979-80  during  which  fiscal  policy 
remained contractionary despite the slowdown in  real  growth.  The policy 
reaction was delayed until  198 1, when a strong fiscal expansion took place. 
11.3  Monetary Policy and Financial Markets 
1  1.3.1  Financial Markets 
We  begin with a brief overview of  financial markets in Korea. Cole and 
Park (1983) give an in-depth analysis of the 1945-78  period, while Cole and 291  KoredChapter 11 
Table 11.3  Fiscal Impulse 
IMF Fiscal Measure 
Actual Deficit 
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Source:  Corbo and Nam (1987b, table 9). 
Note:  The public sector includes Ihe central government (general account, 12 special accounts, and 21 funds) 
and five public enterprise accounts (grain management, monopoly, railways, communications, and supply), 
together with two related funds (grain management and supply). 
Fiscal impulse measure A uses potential GNP obtained from a regression equation. while measure B uses 
potential GNP from peak-through interpolation. 
Cho (1986) and  Y.  C. Park  (1985) provide  additional details about recent 
developments. Readers are referred to these sources for further discussion. 
In  addition to the text tables, we refer to the monetary statistics in the Data 
Appendix. 
Korea’s financial system is composed of three segments. Official banking 
institutions include  five  commercial banks  and  six  special  banks.  These 
institutions have been strictly regulated since they were developed in  1950. 
Until  1982 the  government  operated  the  special  banks  and,  as  majority 
stockholder,  indirectly  managed  the  five  nationwide  commercial  banks. 
Interest rates on deposits and loans were specified by  the government. These 
rates have typically been low relative to inflation rates and to rates available 
elsewhere, creating a persistent excess demand for credit from the banking 
system (see app. table A4.4). Government officials have therefore directly 
influenced the allocation of loans to industrial sectors. Almost no credit from 
the banking system has been supplied to consumers--consumer  loans come 
almost exclusively from curb markets. The Ministry of Finance has been de 
facto responsible for making these decisions which are actually carried out 
by  the  Monetary  Board.7 Liberalizations put  into  place  since  1982  are 
discussed in section 1  1.3.5. 
The second segment, nonbank financial institutions (development institu- 
tions,  savings  institutions,  life  insurance  companies,  and  investment 
corporations) have been subject to limited supervision. The third segment is 292  Susan  M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
the “unregulated”  financial institutions, also called the curb market. While 
not  subject to direct controls, government policies have  sometimes had  a 
significant impact on them as well. 
11.3.2  Controlled Liberalization, 1966-72 
The years  1966-69  were boom ones for Korea, with real growth rates 
averaging  11 percent. Cole and Park  (1983)  label this period  “controlled 
liberalization” in financial markets  .8 There were three major developments. 
The first was the very rapid growth of bank deposits (table 11.4). Deposits 
grew by just 19 percent per year during 1961-64  and by less than 3 percent 
during 1962-64.  They grew by 81 percent in 1965 and by 58 percent during 
1966-70,  rising from 12 percent of GNP in 1966 to 29 percent in 1969. The 
main reason was  the monetary reform of  1965, which had  increased the 
Table 11.4  Deposits, Loans,  and Foreign Loan Guarantees in the Major Banks, 1%1-85 
A. All Banks’ 
Deposits  Loans  Guaranteesb 
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B.  Commerical Banks 
~~ 
DepoSItS  Loans  Guarantees 
YW  Amount  % of Total  Amount  % of Total  Amount  % of Total 
1961  19.3  73.1  12.8  24.4  1.4  87.5 
1964  28.2  63.7  23.1  27.3  9.9  20.5 
1967  137.0  66.0  105.6  45.8  50.3  25.7 
1970  505.4  63.3  441.8  51.9  319.3  42.6 
1973  1,179.2  66.8  987.5  51.8  585.3  42.4 
1976  2,495.4  67.0  2,411.3  54.0  2,165.3  46.0 
1979  6.042.8  61.2  5,634.9  50.7  6,217.6  61.5 
1982  13,080.3  61.4  12,172.2  48.9  14.322.0  76.8 
1985  18,157.0  58.2  19,800.4  48.6  16,382.4  79.5 
Nore:  Data reported in billions of  won and  as average growth rate (96) over the preceding three-year period. 
Includes commercial banks, specialized banks, and the Korea Development Bank. 
bAcceptances of special banks omits those of  the Foreign Exchange Bank which are secondary guarantees of 
acceptances of the other banks. 293  KoredChapter  11 
interest rate ceiling on time deposits from 15 to 30 percent. As a result, real 
interest  rates on  time  deposits  averaged  18.9 percent during  1966-69  as 
compared to  -4.6  percent during 1962-64. 
A  second development was that the deposit growth was accompanied by 
equally rapid  growth in  loans  from the  banking  system (see table  11.4). 
However, all industrial sectors did not have equal access to this credit. The 
government  had  begun  to  target  specific export  industries in  conjunction 
with the first five-year plan. These were given preferential access to loans. 
Short-term export loans,  which were 4 percent of total bank  loans during 
1966, jumped  to  12 percent by  1971. During  1967-71,  short- and  long- 
term export loans accounted for 55 percent of the total increase in bank notes 
and 29 percent of  the increase in the money supply (Hong 1979, 117-30). 
Furthermore, preferential interest rates were established for exporters, for 
purchases of imported intermediates, and for equipment purchases by  export 
and  other target  industries. Table  11.5 compares interest rates  for  export 
loans and discounts during selected years. As shown, the rates were equal in 
1961. But in  1965, exporters paid only 27 percent of  the standard discount 
rate. 
It  is  also  interesting  to  compare  these  interest  rates  to  the  costs  of 
borrowing abroad or borrowing in curb markets. In chapter 3, we showed in 
table 3.6 that the average cost of borrowing in curb markets was 54 percent 
during  1966-70.  With  an  interest  differential  of  12.1  percent,  it  was 
significantly more expensive to borrow at the domestic discount rate than to 
borrow aboard. However, the differential between borrowing domestically at 
the preferential export rate and borrowing abroad was -  5.6 percent. 
The  third  development  was  the  massive  inflow  of  foreign  funds, 
guaranteed by  the banking system. As discussed in  chapter 3, commercial 
banks began to issue guarantees for loans which had been authorized by  the 
government  after  1966.  However,  these  banks  simply  “facilitated”  the 
Table 11.5  Export Promotion: Interest Rates 
Year  Loans for Export  Discount on Bills  Ratio 
1961  13.9  13.9  1 .oo 
1965  6.5  24.0  0.27 
1972  6.0  15.5  0.39 
1976  8.0  17.8  0.45 
1979  19.0  18.5  0.49 
1980  15.0  19.5  0.77 
1981  15.0  16.5  0.91 
1982  10.0  10.0  I .oo 
1984  10.0  10.0-11.5  - 
Source: BOK, Money and Banking Stotisrics,  1984, pp. 384-87. 
Note:  End-of-year interest rates on discounts of deposit money banks. Discounts refer to rates for “superior 
enterprises,”  1976-81. 294  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
loans. They did not evaluate them and, therefore, it was difficult to hold the 
banks responsible when  firms ran into repayment difficulties. These foreign 
loan guarantees amounted to just 3 percent of  total bank loans in  1961. By 
1964 this figure had  rise to 57  percent and by  1967, to 85  percent. The 
growth was especially rapid during 1966-70  (see table 11.4). 
Thus, real growth was financed by  a rapidly expanding financial sector. 
During  1966-71  domestic banks  and  nonbanks financed 40.5 percent of 
corporate sector borrowing, while foreign loans financed 3  1  percent (table 
11.6). 
As  we  have  seen, difficulties emerged during 1970. Growth slowed, the 
current account deficit rose. Monetary growth was restrained in conjunction 
with an IMF standby arrangement. Korean firms began to have difficulties 
servicing  their  external  debts.  The  difficulties  were  exacerbated by  the 
devaluation undertaken in  1971 and 1972 to stimulate exports. These factors 
contributed to  a  financial crisis in  1972.  The  government responded  by 
issuing a presidential decree on 3 August 1972. The purpose of the decree 
was  to  help  out  firms which  were  close to  bankruptcy  and  to  stimulate 
economic growth. In the process, the measure also eliminated many of  the 
liberalizations which had been instituted since 1965. 
There  were  five  major  elements  of  the  decree.'  New  terms  were 
established  for  all  loans  from  unofficial  lenders to  licensed  businesses, 
specifying a three-year grace period, a five-year repayment period, and  a 
1.35 percent monthly interest rate. More favorable terms were established 
for some short-term, high interest rate bank loans. A credit guarantee fund 
was set up to help small and medium-sized industries as well as agricultural 
businesses and  fisheries.  The government supplied  50 billion  won  to  an 
industrial rationalization fund for long-term, low interest rate loans. Finally, 
interest rates in banking institutions were reduced. The time deposit rate was 
lhble 11.6  sourns of  Funds by Corporate Sector  (i  percentages) 
sector  1966-71  1972-76  1977-79  1980-83  1984 
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lowered from 17.4 to 12.6 percent, while the rate on general loans (one year 
or less) was lowered from 19 to 15.5 percent. 
One of  the most  important aspects of  the decree was  that  it  implied  a 
significant transfer from lenders to the unofficial market to borrowers. The 
market  seems to have  almost disappeared for nearly  a year following the 
decree, however, it reemerged after the rise in oil prices at the end of  1973. 
The decree also provided the government with an unusual opportunity to 
collect relatively accurate statistics about the unofficial market as of August 
1972. Unfortunately, comparable figures for other years are not available. As 
Cole  and  Park  (1983,  163-54)  discuss,  many  of  the  discoveries  were 
surprising. In  particular, the total volume of  all informal loans amounted to 
nearly 80 percent of the money supply in 1972. Loans were made to large as 
well as to small firms, and the industrial distribution of the loans was similar 
to the distribution of loans from the banking system. 
11.3.3  Intervention During the Big Push,  1973-80 
Financial market developments during 1973-80  contrast sharply with the 
growth and liberalization of  the late  1960s. Commercial and special banks 
were heavily regulated, with low nominal interest rates,  implying negative 
real rates throughout much of  the period. Consequently, the growth of  the 
banking sector slowed considerably. M2 did not grow relative to GNP. At the 
same  time,  the  government  was  in  the  midst  of  a  major  industrial 
restructuring  and  was  actively  promoting  the  growth  of  HC  industries. 
Furthermore,  interest rate developments significantly increased the  attrac- 
tiveness of bank loans to all domestic borrowers. The result was a substantial 
increase in government intervention to allocate bank credit, combined with 
increased expansion of the nonbank financial institutions. 
As was shown in table 11.5, interest rates on export and other preferential 
loans continued to be subsidized. But discount rates had been reduced, while 
rates on loans to exporters had been raised. The subsidy on commercial bank 
loans to exporters narrowed from 76 percent in  1969 to 42 percent in 1974. 
As verified in  table  11.7, the average cost of  borrowing (in sixty-eight 
manufacturing  industries) fell  from  18 percent  during  1970-1971  to  12 
percent during  1973-74,  before rising back  to  17 percent by  1979. Even 
more striking is that the variance in borrowing costs across industries ranged 
from 56-83  percent during 1970-71,  but  14-21  percent during 1973-79. 
However, these figures do not include loans from unofficial sources and they 
do not incorporate the fact that many firms who would have liked to borrow 
from the banking system were unable to do so. The figures merely point out 
that, for those firms with access, the range of interest rates on bank loans 
narrowed significantly after 1972. 
In chapter 3 table 3.6 showed that the interest differential between home 
and foreign markets fell from 12 percent during 1966-70  to  1 to 3 percent 
during 1972-80.  Domestic credit had become much more attractive, relative 296  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
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Table 11.7  Cost of  Borrowing in Manufacturing Industries (in percentages) 
Year  Average  Variance 
1970  17.92  83.18 
1971  18.40  55.73 
1972  15.05  43. I4 
1973  11.49  14.38 
1974  12.47  17.56 
I975  13.59  15.60 
1976  14.58  16.13 
1977  15.16  18.96 
I978  15.52  18.96 
1979  17.17  21.44 
1980  20.47  20.99 
1981  19.50  13.20 
1982  16.89  8.33 
1983  14.33  8.05 
1984  14.46  5.91 
Source:  BOK, Financial  Statement  Andvsis. various issues, cited in Cole and Cho (1986, table 7). 
Note:  Data drawn from sixty-eight different industries and based on the four-digit  code classification of the 
Korea Standard Industry Classification (KSIC). 
to external borrowing, for those who had access to bank loans, even if  the 
loans were not at subsidized rates. 
Table  11.8 shows  how  additional  banking  sector  credit  was  allocated 
across manufacturing industries during  1973-85.  The figures clearly show 
the  shift  toward  HC  industries  associated  with  the  Big  Push.  During 
1973-74,  66.1 percent of  incremental credit went to light industries.  The 
allocation was almost reversed during  1975-79,  when 59.1 percent of the 
incremental credit went to heavy industry. In  1975 heavy industry accounted 
for only 42 percent of value added in manufacturing. By  1979 its share had 
risen to 51 percent." 
Table 11.8  Incremental Credit Allocation of  the Banking Sector (in percentages) 
Year  Heavy Industry  Light Industry 
1973 -  74  33.9  66.1 
1975-79  59.1  40.9 
1980  59.8  40.2 
1981  52.5  47.5 
1982  68.4  31.6 
1983  58.3  41.7 
1984  56.3  43.7 
1985  63.4  36.6 
Source:  World Bank (1987, table 2.5). 
Note: These figures are the share of net credit increase of deposit money banks and the Korea Development 
Bank.  Light  industry  includes  food  and  beverages,  textiles  and  apparel, wood and  furniture,  paper  and 
printing,  nonmetallic  mineral  products,  and  other  manufacturing.  Heavy  industry  includes  chemicals, 
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In  1977  the  government  switched  from  a  positive  list  loan  allocation 
system in  which  priority  sectors were  explicitly  listed,  to  a negative  list 
system; however,  the  excess  demand  for  funds  from  the  banking  system 
continued to imply that loans were severely rationed. 
Table  11.6  showed  that  loans  from  the  banking  sector  continued  to 
account  for  approximately  30  percent  of  total  corporate  sector  financing 
during 1972-79.  However, the importance of  foreign borrowing had fallen 
to just  13 percent during  1977-79.  Nonbank financial institutions became 
considerably more  important,  accounting for  18 percent of  total corporate 
finance in 1977-79  as compared to 8 percent during 1966-71.  As discussed 
above,  a  number  of  measures  were  undertaken  during  the  1970s  to 
encourage the growth of  the  nonbanks,  in  the hopes of  channeling  funds 
away from the unofficial money market. 
Deposit growth provides one measure of the increasing importance of this 
sector. While the growth of bank deposits slowed (see table 11.4 and A4.3), 
deposits in nonbank financial institutions increased from  16 percent of  total 
bank and nonbank deposits in 1971 to 30 percent in  1980. The development 
is important because, as Cole and Cho (1986) discuss, the expansion of this 
partially regulated sector offset some of the effects of  increased interventions 
in the banking sector. 
11.3.4  Economic Crisis,  1979-81 
Thus,  1973-79  was a period of  considerable government intervention in 
financial markets. However, as discussed in chapter 5, concern over inflation 
and  resource  misallocations associated with  the  Big  Push  led  to  the  CSP 
announced in April  1979. One of the plan’s hallmarks was that, for the first 
time,  it  expressed  the  view  that  current  government  intervention  was 
excessive  and  that,  at  Korea’s  present  stage  of  development,  it  was 
appropriate  to  begin  to  liberalize  both  trade  restrictions  and  financial 
markets. 
We  have  already  noted  that  one  component  of  the  CSP  was  a  fiscal 
contraction.  On  the  monetary  side,  the  plan  called  for  more  restrictive 
monetary  policy,  increased  nominal  (and  real)  interest  rates,  and  an 
improvement in the preferential loan allocation scheme. In fact, M2 growth 
slowed from over 35 percent per year during 1976-78  to 25 percent in 1979. 
There was also a slight increase in interest rates,  but accelerating inflation 
meant that the real interest rate fell to 0.2 percent on discounts and to -  9.3 
percent on loans to exporters. 
By the end of  1979, Korea was in the midst of  an economic crisis. The 
second oil shock, the agricultural disasters, and the death of  President Park 
all contributed to the severe difficulties in  1980. Resuming positive growth 
and  reducing  inflation  and  the debt  burden  became the  government’s  top 
priorities. 
A stabilization package  was  initiated  in  January  1980,  supported  by  a 
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combination of devaluation, fiscal and monetary restraint, and higher interest 
rates.  In  addition,  the  higher  oil  prices  were  to  be  passed  through  to 
consumers. 
The government raised interest rates in June 1980. The discount rate was 
increased by  1-2  percent, while the rate on loans to exporters was increased 
by  6  percent,  substantially  narrowing  the  differential  (see  table  11.5). 
However, inflation rose from 18 to 29 percent. Futhermore, the deteriorating 
situation led  to  a  relaxation of  some  other policies.  As  discussed above, 
government expenditures on social services were increased. In addition, the 
target money growth rates were increased slightly. M2 grew by  26.7 percent 
in  1980 compared to 25 percent in  1979. 
In  1981 there was some improvement in economic performance. Growth 
rates were positive, while inflation and the current account deficit began to 
decline.  As we  have  seen,  there was a further depreciation and  a further 
fiscal expansion. However, monetary policy remained restrictive. M1 grew 
by  just  4.6  percent compared to  18 percent during  1979-80.  M2  growth 
remained relatively constant at 25 percent. The government also continued 
its  financial liberalizations, this  time reducing the discount rate (see table 
1  1.5). Finally, price controls were eliminated on a number of key items. 
11.3.5  Financial Market Liberalization, 1982-86 
Two  developments took  place  during  1982-86.  First,  the  government 
continued to pursue a restrictive monetary policy, helping to reduce inflation 
to  2.3  percent.  Second, additional steps have  been  taken  toward  financial 
liberalization. We  conclude this chapter by  discussing each development. 
A  new  policy package to revive the domestic economy was initiated in 
January 1982. The package included further liberalization (to be discussed 
below),  and  also  called  for  a  loosening  of  monetary  policy.  In  fact,  a 
financial  scandal  in  the  curb  market  in  May  1982  forced  two  large 
corporations into bankruptcy. The incident triggered a contraction in  loans 
available  from  the  curb  market,  threatening  many  other  firms  with 
bankruptcy.  In  order  to  bail  out  these  firms,  there  was  a  major  credit 
expansion-MI  grew  by  over  45  percent  during  1982.  (However,  M2 
growth increased only marginally.) Since then,  monetary  growth has been 
quite restrictive. M1 (M2) grew by just  17 percent (15 percent) in  1983 and 
0.5 percent (8 percent) in  1985. It has remained low by  historical standards 
during 1985-86. 
Banking  sector  growth  has  slowed  markedly  since  1979.  However, 
nonbank financial institutions (NBFI) have continued to grow quite rapidly. 
The ratio of  deposits in  NBFI  to  total  bank  deposits (demand,  time,  and 
savings) rose from 36.1 percent in 1979 to 71.7 percent in 1984, and then to 
94.8 percent in  1986. The rapid expansion of  this sector suggests that the 
slowdown  in  bank  growth  overstates  the  extent  to  which  financial 
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of  M1  slowed from  23.9 percent during  1973-79  to  15.3 percent  during 
1979-86,  M3 growth  (which includes  NBFI)  slowed only  slightly,  from 
27.9 percent during 1973-79  to 26.5 percent during 1979-86. 
We  turn  finally  to  financial  liberalization.  The  fifth  five-year  plan 
(1982-86),  formulated  during  1981,  emphasized  trade  and  financial 
liberalization and  a commitment to  more  neutral  government  policies.  In 
contrast  to  recent  experiences  in  Latin  America,  the  financial  market 
liberalization was to be undertaken gradually. Although a number of  steps 
have been taken, an evaluation of this policy shift remains premature." 
During  1981-83,  the government sold its shares in the large commercial 
banks.  It  also attempted to  restrict ownership by  single shareholders to  8 
percent. However, as shown in table 11.9, ownership of many of these banks 
is concentrated among the chaebol. The government has authorized two new 
commercial banks.  It has  also relaxed the restrictions on chartering  NBFI 
and on the activities of the branches of foreign banks in Korea. 
Interest  rates  were  restructured  in  1982,  although  the  government 
continues to set ceilings for bank loans and deposits. As was shown in table 
11.5, the  subsidy to  export  loans was eliminated.  In  table  11.7, we  also 
showed the decline in the variance of borrowing costs across industries, from 
21 percent during 1979-80  to just 6 percent by  1984. The government also 
acted to redress the discrimination against small firms during the Big Push. 
Small firms have received slightly lower rates than large firms since 1982. In 
1984 access to additional credit for the large conglomerates was restricted, 
increasing the availability of  credit to small firms. 
In  1982 the government also abolished direct credit controls for deposit 
money  banks,  switching to a monetary  policy  based  on  specified reserve 
Table  11.9 
Conglomerate  Cho Heung  Korea First  Hanil  Bank of  Seoul  Commercial Bank 




4. Lucky Goldstar 
5. Hanjin 
6.  Taekwang 
7.  Ssangyong 
8. Daelim 
9.  Shindongah 
10.  Dong Ah 
11.  Hanil-Kukje 
Memo item:  ownership 
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requirements,  rediscounts,  and  open  market  operations.  However,  the 
government does continue to have considerable influence over the allocation 
of bank credit. It has intervened heavily to restructure industries which built 
up  overcapacity during  the  Big  Push.  As  was  shown  in  table  11.8, this 
implied a shift in credit allocation bank to heavy industry during 1985. 
Thus, Korea has made some steps toward financial market liberalization in 
equalizing borrowing costs across industries. Furthermore,  as Cole and Cho 
(1986) point  out,  the  expansion of  the only  partially  regulated NBFI  has 
contributed  to  a  de  facto  liberalization  of  the  overall  financial  system. 
However,  authorities  have  proceeded  cautiously,  continuing  to  influence 
credit allocation. In this sense, the policy shifts may have been more a matter 
of  degree than an “about  face”  in direction. This viewpoint is advanced by 
Y.  C. Park (1985a). It is too early to evaluate the results of the liberalization, 
or to attempt to draw lessons from the experience.  Korea may  soon have 
some  interesting lessons  to  teach  about  the  economic  consequences  of  a 
controlled financial liberalization. 
12  Income Distribution 
As  we  have  studied  in  detail  in  previous  chapters,  Korea  underwent  a 
successful  macroeconomic  adjustment  while  maintaining  high  rates  of 
growth. In  many cases,  rapidly expanding developing countries have been 
able to achieve remarkable increases in per capita incomes, but one of the 
costs has  been the deterioration of  an already skewed income distribution. 
Consequently, the gains have bypassed a large part of the population. This 
chapter examines distributive aspects of Korea’s experience from the  1960s 
to the 1980s. 
There have been a number of  studies of income distribution in Korea. We 
will refer to them throughout the chapter. Those focusing on the first half of 
Korea’s  rapid  growth  (through  the  early  1970s)  include  Adelman  and 
Robinson (1978), Rao (1978), Renaud (1976) and Mason et al. (1980). The 
studies consistently found that  income  was  equitably distributed  in  Korea 
relative to other developing countries, and that Korea’s economic growth did 
not  require or result in a deterioration.  In  fact, the rapid economic growth 
fueled by expansion of labor-intensive export sectors was widely believed to 
have improved the distribution of income during this period. However, later 
studies  caused  considerable  concern  among  policymakers  because  they 
seemed to show a noticeable deterioration of  income distribution during the 
1970s. See, for example, Choo (1977), Szall (1981), and Jung (1982). 